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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

the objectives or terms of another court's decree. As the water court
explained, the federal court in the Blue River Decree addressed only
those relative priorities at issue at the time of adjudication.
Grand Junction also contended that the water court's decree directly conflicted with the Blue River Decree. Grand Junction argued
the Blue River Decree expressly prohibits the parties to the decree
from asserting or claiming, as against each other, any different priorities than those specified in the final Blue River Decree. The Colorado
Supreme Court rejected this argument as well. The court stated that
Denver's application for a refill right with a 1987 priority date does not
concern or interfere with any provision of the Blue River Decree, including rights junior to Denver's original fill right. The refill right is
junior to all the appropriations adjudicated in 1955, and, according to
the terms of the water court's judgment, cannot be exercised to the
detriment of any priority awarded in the Blue River Decree. Consequently, Denver's application for a refill right did not directly conflict
with the Blue River Decree nor did it implicate the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction to implement the Blue River Decree.
Matt Diliman

O'Neill v. Simpson, 958 P.2d 1121 (Colo. 1998) (holding that the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred claim that water court lacked jurisdiction).
In March 1912, six water rights in the Cache Creek, Arlington, and
Clear Creek Ditches were decreed to Twin Lakes Placers, Limited. In
June 1912, an injunction was entered against Twin Lakes because its
hydraulic mining process polluted the Arkansas river. As a result,
Twin Lakes abandoned the six water rights.
This appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court represented Dennis
O'Neill's fourth attempt to revive these abandoned water rights. In the
subject appeal, O'Neill argued that the water court lacked jurisdiction
in the first trial ("O'Neill I") to determine whether the water rights had
been abandoned. In O'Neill I, the water court rejected O'Neill's initial
attempt to revive the six water rights and held that these rights had
been abandoned.
In the present case, O'Neill contended that the water court lacked
jurisdiction in O'Neill I due to a defective service of process and because the water court's judgment represented a collateral attack on a
series of possessory and use rights determined in various prior quiet
title decrees. The water court dismissed O'Neill's subsequent complaint and awarded attorney's fees to the Defendant State Engineer.
After sternly warning O'Neill that further non-meritorious attempts to
relitigate these matters would result in severe sanctions, the court affirmed the water court's determination.
The court held that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the trial court's jurisdiction unless the
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trial court manifestly abused its authority. The court reasoned that
O'Neill had a full and fair opportunity to oppose the water court's jurisdiction in O'Neill I, and on appeal of that case, but failed to do so.
The court further ruled that the subject claim was substantially vexatious, and therefore, the State Engineer was entitled to attorney's fees
for defending the appeal.
David A. Laird

CONNECTICUT
Hartt v. Schwartz, No. CV 920331912S, 1997 WL 625467, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 1997) (holding that a conveyance of property,
which housed a dry cleaning operation from 1967 to 1978, was subject
to Connecticut's Hazardous Waste Transfer Act).
In 1986, the Hartts purchased property from Schwartz. The property housed a dry cleaning operation from 1967 to 1978. The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") then notified the Hartts that contamination from the old dry cleaning
operation had migrated off-site. The Hartts were ordered to clean up
the waste.
The Hartts sued Schwartz. They claimed Schwartz was responsible
for disclosing the condition of the property, according to the Connecticut Hazardous Waste Transfer Act. Schwartz moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the property transfer was only subject to the
1985 version and not the 1987 amendment to the Act. The summary
judgment motion was examined and ruled on by the superior court.
The court held that "the 1987 amendment should be applied retroactively and that summary judgment should therefore not be
granted." Additionally, it was noted that the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act ("CEPA") "appears to contemplate the possibility of a suit by a private citizen against an entity other than the state for
the consequences of past pollution." Therefore, the Hartts could
bring suit against Schwartz for past pollution.
The court perused the language of the amendment, as well as legislative intent and history in reaching its decision. It observed that the
amendment clearly directed transferors of property to include all operations since 1967 which may have generated waste, and that dry
cleaning operations were plainly included in the amendment. Likewise, the legislative intent, as asserted in the state's code, indicated that
there was a "public interest to provide all persons with an adequate
remedy to protect the air, water and other natural resources from unreasonable pollution.... ." The court pointed out that the Director of
the DEP Hazardous Waste Unit testified at legislative hearings that the
amendment was meant to clarify a loophole, ensuring that dry cleaning operations were included within the Act's scope. The testimony
also indicated that the inclusion of the May 1967 date was designed to

